September 30 – October 1, 2002. There takes place in New Delhi a meeting of climate change negotiators. Union minister for environment T R Baalu tables an "informal paper"; country-representatives then respond to it.

Everyone treats the exercise seriously. Diplomats never take anything lightly, especially pages full of pure diplomatese. They also like to paw the textual turf, turning words up, sniffing for signs. Baalu is CoP-8 president-designate. But he is also the environment minister of a developing country, with crucial stakes in climate change talks. To what extent does the paper reflect the official CoP-8 agenda (by now decided in many little meetings like this one)? To what extent does it reflect India’s, and developing country, concerns? What kind of a conference blueprint is it?

Let us con the text of the paper for ourselves.

"CoP-8 is well positioned to be a milestone for strengthening UNFCCC implementation, with CoP-7 having settled a number of institutional issues. CoP-8 may develop a framework of action for implementation…"

So the basic issue is going to that of "implementation". The fact that CoP-8 would deal with this issue had already been laid out at the end of CoP-7. So Baalu is merely towing the line here. But when it talks about developing "a framework of action for implementation", all kinds of expectations are raised.

These questions sound neutral, but lead to other crucial ones. For instance: what have the atmosphere’s biggest polluters done about the way in which they spew loads of carbon dioxide into it? The word "implementation" itself is like an umbrella. Other words, notions, indeed politically charged issues — conflicting interpretations of UNFCCC, differing visions of development — shelter under it. For instance, the issues of "compliance", or meeting "commitments". And most crucially, the question of "equity".

In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol laid out that developed countries (primarily responsible for the global warming that tinkers with the climate system) had to limit their emissions to a certain level (5.2 per cent below what they emitted in 1990) by the period 2008-2012. Are they on the way to doing that? Are they complying?

The Protocol also came up with a policy instrument, a mechanism called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under which the big polluters could set up projects in developing countries that helped to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and so gain credit. Since 1997, it has become clear that CDM is an instrument that merely puts our atmosphere up for trade, and profit.

Look at it this way. You are a developed nation. Under CDM you can line up a developing country, sell it efficient technology, or put money into planting trees, do all it takes to make that country reduce emissions. Aa-ha. You have kept the atmosphere cleaner. Because you have done that, you will get credits, credits you can use to meet your Kyoto Protocol target.

It’s neat. You might have to spend US $100 on each tonne of carbon emission reduced in your country. Why do that, when you can go elsewhere — to poor, developing nations with begging bowls at the ready — and do the same for US $15-20? Really neat.

CDM is controversial. For developing countries, it means re-thinking growth strategy for someone else’s sake. For developed nations, it’s manna from heaven. So: is a country committed to CDM really committed to cleaning up the atmosphere? Is this the way to meet "commitments"?

At CoP-8, therefore, "implementation" could be a thorny issue. But diplomatese makes sure we don’t know how India is going to negotiate this issue. Will CoP-8 really be a milestone? For whom? Pro-CDMites, or anti-CDMites?

In responding to the paper, the US was quick to point out that poverty as an issue was distinct from climate change issues. CoP-8 needn’t talk about it. In saying so, it was using an old trick. In the climate change negotiation process, developing countries have often raised this issue. Invariably, they have been out-manoeuvred. So the question now becomes: at CoP-8, will India and other developing nations be able to push home this point?

One reason why developing nations get out-manoeuvred is that the moment they raise this issue, they also bring out the begging bowl. They begin to demand money, and technology transfer. Their own attitude to the issue is a reductive one, for poverty is not an economic issue, it is an ecological one. Over the years, this attitude has rendered climate change-poverty links redundant.

Will CoP-8 witness a change in attitude? Can the issue be earnestly treated as an equity problem?

But in negotiations, these issues are dealt with in terms of technology-transfer and funding under CDM. The developed country strategy here is clear: let’s take the cheap way out. At CoP-8, they will play this very hand. Will developing countries be able to resist, as they have managed to so far? Will CoP-8 see them caving in? Again, the informal paper’s diplomatese provides no clue. If mum on this, CoP-8 could be a disaster for developing countries.

Many developing countries, while responding to the paper, agreed with the "India approach". China, crucially, called it a "good basis" for discussions at CoP-8. Small island states, and countries such as Zimbabwe, reiterated their stance on adaptation. Oil-rich countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia didn’t want energy issues to be discussed, thus indicating they were uncomfortable with the theme of the second round-table session.

Indeed, countries such as Australia and Canada were even more uncomfortable. Canada and Japan wanted discussions to be limited to the "post-Kyoto world", clearly indicating that the Protocol would be the basis to their approach to implementation. Canada wanted the word "implementation" itself to be deleted.