January 05, 2001
Response: Equity is not the only way
Here at the Centre for Science and Environment we have received some responses to
Equity Watch and its articles. Here are some of the opposite points of view as
expressed in regards to Anil Agarwal's editorial, US Tastes Cream Pie, which was featured
in Equity Watch, Down to Earth magazine, and CSE's fortnightly email.
From: Michael Cummings
Stanford University
The New Delhi Centre for Science and Environment asserts the need to
allocate global carbon emissions allowances on a per capita basis. Its scholars argue that
emissions trading under Kyoto would: "freeze inequity in emissions," encourage
trading in the fossil fuel sector (thus subsidising fossil fuels and raising the cost of
renewable energy), and that trading would mean the absence of established property rights
over the global commons (the atmosphere) and thus discourage developing countries from
adopting renewable energy. While their argument for the need for equitable emissions
worldwide is compelling, per capita emissions allocation and the implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol are not mutually exclusive.
The need for a long-term global GHG emissions reduction mechanism that
allocates emissions on a per capita basis is clear. It is the most equitable allocation
mechanism and in turn has the highest probability of worldwide acceptance and
sustainability. However, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol with emissions trading does
not preclude the implementation of such a mechanism in the future, nor does it necessarily
freeze the inequity in emissions or discourage renewable energy development in developing
countries.
First and foremost, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would be an
acknowledgement by the developed countries (especially the US) that they need to reduce
GHG emissions. This is a critical step in the process of a "contraction and
convergence." Although the US may not be "contracting" significantly at
home, such an agreement would institutionalise the need for long-term GHG reductions and
accordingly affect decision making at many levels.
If the US were to trade for the majority of its emissions reductions,
this would not "freeze inequity in emissions." Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
or Joint Implementation (JI) projects would reduce emissions in less developed countries
(LDCs) in comparison to development in the absence of such programs. However, it does not
freeze the LDC’s emissions at that level or set any sort of number for the eventual
emissions levels of the LDCs. The US is likely to be the biggest "trader" under
Kyoto and there is great potential for the US to meet a significant amount of its Kyoto
commitment by buying Russia’s "hot air". Thus, this should not freeze
emissions inequity in most developing countries. Additionally, if CDM or JI projects
utilise energy- efficiency or renewable energy, this would result in the same energy
service as a higher GHG-emitting conventional energy. Since all countries desire the
products and services that emissions enable, not the emissions themselves, CDM does not
freeze overall inequity.
Kyoto would not necessarily discourage renewable energy in the
developing world. Since implementing renewables is potentially cheaper in developed
countries than LDCs, and establishing distributed renewables is often cheaper than
extending fossil-fueled grid-connected electricity in many LDCs, many CDM projects may
encourage renewable development projects in LDCs. Under any trading mechanism, even one
under a per capita emissions allocation system, opportunities will exist for countries to
profit from selling credits earned by having a more renewable or efficient energy system.
Thus LDCs have every incentive to develop more renewables in order to profit from the
developed countries’ enormous investments in fossil-fuel infrastructure.
Adoption of Kyoto will start the process of contraction and convergence
to per capita emissions allocation. In the process, it does not freeze developing
countries emissions levels at any level, and can potentially increase the use of renewable
energy worldwide. Although per capita emissions allocation should be the end goal of all
international climate treaties, an imperfect Kyoto may be necessary to start working
towards such a goal.
From: Marian Diaz Goebes
Stanford University
Anil Agarwal, director of the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE),
argues for carbon emissions based on a per capita allocation and cites the agreement of
more developed countries’ (MDC) scientists. I disagree with Agarwal, particularly
with his assertion that prior emissions based allocations hamper development in less
developed countries (LDCs), his concept of the political feasibility of both schemes and
his description of a per capita allocations scheme as simple.
The development gap has existed for over a century between LDCs and
MDCs and continues to widen. For MDCs to provide substantial assistance, they need
economic incentive. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol provides this
opportunity, as their investment yields a profit in both countries involved. Opponents of
the Kyoto Protocol argue that, for fairness, LDCs should be allowed to develop without
regulation as MDCs did. This would damage people and environment as LDCs passed through a
nightmarish industrial revolution and as MDC multinationals continue to plunder LDC
resources. LDCs could develop faster and less painfully with the economic and
technological assistance of MDCs coming from CDM and the Kyoto Protocol would create
international legislation to control MDC-LDC interaction.
Agarwal calls the allocation of carbon allowances on past emissions
"not politically feasible" to address the same complaint lodged against per
capita allowances. However, while emissions allocations in the Kyoto Protocol make for a
political stretch for LDCs, per capita emissions make for a political fairy tale in the
US. The US congress has made it clear through the Byrd-Hagel resolution and its stance at
CoP-6 that it will never pass a resolution that would drastically limit its emissions.
Most of the other Annex I countries, while taking a more liberal stance than the US, would
also not back per capita emissions allocations for fear of crippling their economies. An
effective global climate treaty requires the participation of the majority of MDCs,
scaring them away with near-impossible emissions limitations would kill all hopes of
ratifying any protocol.
I disagree with Agarwal’s description of per capita emissions
allocations as simple. Does the CSE propose using current populations, using projected
populations, or readjusting emissions annually based on updated censuses? The last option
seems the most equitable, but it would require large resources to determine, and
corruption or charges of statistics fraud would cause international disputes. Also it
would discourage a country from curbing population growth.
The Kyoto Protocol, with its allowances based on past emissions, stands
as unfair. However, the measure governs only from 2008-2012. Agarwal quotes a British
commission that states that the protocol "will eventually require" per capita
emissions allocations. The key word is eventually. After 2012 (or a few years later, if
the target years get pushed back), we will revise the system, including a possible change
in emissions allocation scheme. But at the moment, we must focus on ratifying a measure
that will curb greenhouse gas emissions and serve as the rough draft for future protocols.
As a compromise, Kyoto Protocol should increase emissions allowances for LDCs to leave
them a larger margin of growth. This will cause total emissions to exceed desired levels;
but lenient controls are better than no controls, and LDCs and MDCs will probably require
them before they join on. The alternative, not signing any protocol and allowing global
warming to continue unchecked, will hit LDCs the most, exacerbating the development gap
and inequity. No one wants this, least of all LDCs.
From: Molly Sullivan
Stanford University
The Centre for Science and Environment’s (CSE) argument for
allocation of carbon permits based on a per capita method is one that promotes equity in
some ways, and may someday be feasible, but as of now is impossible and promotes unwanted
behaviors. The CSE has excellent criticisms of the reduction method in the Kyoto Protocol.
Assignment based on past emissions levels does reward historically high emitters and
penalises those with already efficient technologies in place, but per capita allocation is
also not a reasonable means of allocation.
The greatest current environmental threat is not global warming, but
unchecked population growth. Per capita emission quotas serve only to reward those
countries that have been ineffective in combating population growth. Countries, especially
developing countries, with high growth rates and low levels of development will be given
no reason to attempt to develop with cleaner technologies, since their allocation will
exceed what they realistically need to develop with clean technologies. While this would
be a means for massive wealth transfer from the developed to the developing world through
the buying and selling of carbon permits, unchecked transfers of money is neither the most
efficient or effective way to aid the development of less developed nations.
In addition the CSE argues that this is essentially a northern problem.
Although, the North is primarily responsible, the repercussions will be felt worldwide.
The primary goal of the South should be to get the North committed to a reduction scheme
as soon as possible. Allocation on a per capita basis is a political impossibility. There
is no way to get around that a minority of the population is responsible for the majority
of the damage. The only way to begin to counter the problem is to get that minority
involved as soon as possible in any sort of reductions. Regulations can be tightened and
allocation systems changed later. The priority is to get the heavy emitters to begin to
take action, and a per capita allocation system will serve only to hinder negotiations.
The CSE also claims that a per capita emissions system will work
because of simplicity. However, it is not a simple as it sounds. Do you allocate based on
population in a base year? How do you change the allocation based on growth in the
population? If we renegotiate as population increases, developing countries with unchecked
population growth will be rewarded and more industrialised nations that have taken serious
steps to control population will be punished. Who oversees and enforces the carbon market?
Permit trading on a small scale such as the sulphur dioxide reduction in California was
effective because it was easy to oversee. In a large international market nothing is
simple, transaction costs are high, and even with a per capita method there are big
questions as to how to fairly allocate and not reward population growth.
The per capita system has some major flaws and is politically
infeasible. The northern countries are holding almost all of the bargaining chips, and so
regardless of whether it is totally equitable, a system the North will agree to needs to
be the one proposed. In addition, it is hard to see how per capita allocation will not
promote population growth and high carbon infrastructure in countries whose allocation
well exceeds their emissions.
From: Daniel Rutherford
Stanford University
The New Delhi Centre for Science and Environment’s essay upon the
equity implications of the Kyoto Protocol injects a much-needed alternative perspective
into the current international debate about climate change. The Centre’s position,
which argues for a system wherein national GHG emission rights are allocated on a per
capita basis, represents a fundamentally different method from that instituted under the
Kyoto Protocol. This difference has important implications for international equity.
As the Centre correctly points out, allocations of future emissions
caps predicated upon percentage reductions from a base year are fundamentally unfair to
less developed countries (LDCs). By allowing developed countries (DCs) to demonstrate
"progress" by reducing emissions from outrageous to merely astronomical levels,
such a system serves to legitimise current inequalities in worldwide energy use. Future
agreements which require LDCs to make the similar percentage reductions from a
hypothetical baseline also run the risk of disadvantaging them by requiring painful cuts
be made from an already comparatively low level.
Additionally, by instituting an international trading system through
the CDM without creating a system by which pollution permits are distributed based upon a
"right to develop", current emissions baselines are implicitly treated as
morally justifiable. Few informed individuals would argue that the current distribution of
wealth throughout the world is equitable. The system of emissions allocations instituted
under Kyoto essentially argues that this is the case.
At the same time, there are reasons to be concerned about the
institution of a system allocating national pollution rights based on population. Given
that population growth will be one of the most important drivers of emissions growth in
the future, such a system presents obvious perverse incentives. Additionally, the
political feasibility of such a system is questionable. Although the Centre argues that
any agreement that does not ultimately base emissions rights upon a per capita standard is
also politically infeasible, it seems useful to distinguish between long and short-term
political concerns. At its heart, the Kyoto Protocol represents a good faith effort by DCs
to limit their emissions without requiring concurrent reductions by LDCs. Short-term
political feasibility in DCs will thus be more important in determining the success of the
Kyoto Protocol. Given that Kyoto has the potential to be an important starting point for
international cooperative efforts to address climate change, it makes sense to take the
route less controversial in DCs in the short term, while moving towards a more equitable
per capita system in the future.
Perhaps a useful way of evaluating a given international climate policy would be to
imagine some kind of equity "baseline". Few would argue that the world is
currently an equal place. In the short term, a policy which will make the world more
equitable relative to this hypothetical baseline would be desirable. The Kyoto Protocol,
although flawed, represents such a policy, since DCs would limit their own ability to
pollute the global atmospheric commons without demanding similar constraints for LDCs.
Overly rigid demands by LDCs for a per capita standard has the potential to destroy Kyoto,
thus leading to no relative increase in equity. In the long run, the Centre’s logic
is undeniable: only a system allocating emissions rights upon a per capita basis is
absolutely equitable. In the short term, however, it may be best to accept a relative
improvement in equity in order to stimulate international cooperative efforts. Following
this logic, I would argue that the interests of LDCs will be best advanced by supporting
the Kyoto Protocol in its present form.
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